Senior ‘Israeli’ Officers ’Acted Cowardly’ On October 7: ‘Israeli’ Media

Weiss confirmed that high-ranking ‘Israeli’ officers fled and left soldiers behind, noting that this affected the morale of the 'internal' front.

He also confirmed that eight ‘Israeli’ soldiers were injured by "friendly fire," adding that settlers were also injured in the process. For instance, according to Weiss, ‘Israeli’ soldiers "accidentally" opened fire at two employees of the electricity company, pointing out that this is "part of the chaos prevalent in the ‘Israeli’ army."

When asked if this information about senior officers fleeing is reliable, as it is "a serious accusation," according to the interviewer, Weiss mentioned that he obtained the information from two officers; a lieutenant and a captain, and gathered other information from several sources.

He also made it clear that he could present documents proving his information to the ‘Israeli’ public. The interviewer mentioned that Weiss was hosted just two days after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, noting that the conversation included discussions about ‘Israeli’ intelligence failures that shocked the internal front.

‘Israeli’ officials had received intelligence indicating that the Palestinian Resistance movement Hamas was gearing up for a significant operation a year before the Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, but they chose to dismiss the warnings, arguing that they were "beyond Hamas' capabilities," The New York Times reported on Friday citing a document, emails, and interviews.

According to the paper, the intelligence report, while lacking a specific timeframe, included a planning blueprint that Al-Qassam Brigades fighters subsequently followed. It detailed operation elements such as an initial rocket barrage, efforts to disrupt surveillance through drones and other means, and waves of Resistance fighters crossing into settlements via both land and air routes.

Even when an analyst from the ‘Israeli’ signals intelligence - Unit 8200 - raised concerns about Al-Qassam carrying out a training exercise consistent with the outlined plan, her warnings were met with dismissal. She explicitly labeled it as a "plan designed to start a war," but a reviewing colonel suggested exercising "patience" with the situation, The Times added.

The ‘Israeli’ colonel, in the Gaza Division, praised the analysis but said the drill was part of a “totally imaginative” scenario, not an indication of the Resistance's ability to execute it.

The document that was passed on to ‘Israeli’ officials contained sensitive security information about ‘Israeli’ military capabilities and locations gathered by the Resistance group and was circulated widely among ‘Israeli’ military and intelligence leaders. However, it remained unclear whether senior politicians had reviewed its contents.

An ‘Israeli’ military assessment conducted the previous year concluded that it was premature to assert that Hamas had officially approved the plan, which was described as too ambitious and difficult to be implemented, and thus was disregarded.

The intelligence community continued to believe that Hamas leader in Gaza Yehya Sinwar was not actively pursuing war with ‘Israel.’