Will “Israel” Comply with the Ceasefire Agreement and Withdraw from Lebanon?

Recently, numerous contradictory statements have emerged concerning the decisiveness and credibility of the enemy's decision to withdraw from the border areas it occupied in Lebanon during its recent aggression. While several sources close to the entity's decision-making circles have suggested that the sixty-day period for withdrawal is neither fixed nor certain, no official announcement has been made. With roughly a month remaining, the end of this period will serve as the true benchmark for confirming the withdrawal.

Several political, military and field considerations underpin the enemy’s decision to withdraw or delay the deadline. These considerations can be outlined as follows:

First – Regarding Lebanon, all its components—whether the political authorities, the Lebanese army or the Resistance—remain committed to their pledged obligations under Resolution 1701, despite the extensive violations committed by the enemy. The Lebanese army continues its efforts to provide the necessary personnel and equipment for deployment throughout the region south of the Litani River, particularly in the border strip still occupied by enemy units. Meanwhile, theR demonstrates full readiness to fulfill its commitments by facilitating the army’s deployment and evacuating any military presence from the entire area south of the Litani. This is carried out under the official sponsorship of Lebanese authorities and in close coordination with the Monitoring Committee responsible for implementing the agreement, addressing any difficulties or obstacles that arise.

Second – The Monitoring Committee for implementing the agreement—which includes representatives from Lebanon, “Israel”, the United States [as chair], France and UNIFIL—has thus far failed to demonstrate the necessary ability to compel the enemy to cease its violations of the ceasefire terms. Particularly, the American and French representatives, who are generally considered favorable to the enemy, have not exerted effective pressure to stop the blatant field incursions into southern regions, some of which were inaccessible to the enemy during confrontations with the resistance prior to the ceasefire. Thus far, the committee’s role has been limited to observation, with no authority to enforce the aggressor party's compliance with its obligations.

Third – “Israel,” the sole violator of the agreement, continues its aggressive breaches. However, its decision to implement the withdrawal is likely tied to the following factors:

1- The sixty-day withdrawal deadline is contingent on the full field deployment of the Lebanese army in the area south of the Litani River up to the border with occupied Palestine. This deployment must be exclusive, without any military presence of the Resistance under any pretext. The Resistance’s clear and explicit commitment to this condition has been a longstanding demand of “Israel” and was one of the primary objectives of its recent aggression against Lebanon. Should “Israel” refuse to withdraw under the agreement, Lebanon’s commitments, particularly those of the Resistance, would be nullified, maintaining the same military and field realities that existed before the recent aggression. Consequently, “Israel” would fail to achieve a key objective of its aggression.

2- The level of violations carried out by the enemy, such as targeted explosions against homes or infrastructure it claims are resistance-related, appears to be decreasing. This reduction is due to the widespread destruction already inflicted and the exposure of most resistance infrastructure in the occupied border area. Consequently, the continued presence of enemy units beyond the sixty-day deadline would hold little operational value, aside from being a declaration of occupation. On the other hand, a full withdrawal could allow “Israel” to push resistance military capabilities back to the Litani River, aligning better with its strategic interests.

3- Another sensitive factor influencing “Israel’s” position is the political, security and military changes in Syria following the ceasefire agreement. “Israel” views the disruption of logistical support to the Resistance as a significant advantage. This new reality grants “Israel” a sense of security it previously lacked, enabling it to withdraw from the immediate border areas without the constant threat posed by the Resistance’s logistical networks. This development carries substantial implications for “Israel’s” commitment to implementing its withdrawal, as replenishing the resistance’s lost military capabilities from the recent confrontation is now considerably more challenging. The enemy views this as a newfound margin of safety, one it lacked prior to these shifts in Syria. With this enhanced sense of security, “Israel” finds it more viable to distance itself from the direct geographic oversight of the Resistance’s armament operations—a longstanding source of security and military anxiety for the entity.

Finally, while “Israel” has historically shown little regard for international obligations, its decision to withdraw will likely be driven by its own strategic calculations. The considerations outlined above suggest that the enemy’s interest in withdrawing will ultimately outweigh its reluctance. Any delays will likely be presented as technical issues, not indicative of a broader refusal to comply with the agreement.